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The burning ethical question raised by the COVID-19 pandemic is how to deal fairly and 
ethically with a large number of patients simultaneously becoming critically unwell. Across 
the world, in both developed and developing countries, health systems are grappling with 
the possibility or the reality that the demand for intensive medical care will outstrip 
availability. There is a need for ethical guidelines on how to allocate treatment, but such 
guidelines are potentially highly controversial.
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 In this commentary, we set out a simple 
algorithm (Figure 1), including what we take to be the essential ethical principles that ought 
to guide resource allocation in any country or setting as well as optional elements that will 
vary between countries depending on the weight placed on different ethical values (Table 
1). 
 
Support patient autonomy 
When a competent patient presents with a diagnosis (e.g. viral pneumonia), they should be 
provided with the facts about the available treatments and given the opportunity to express 
their personal wishes, priorities and values. Requests may not be able to be accommodated, 
but competent refusals must be respected. Refusal can be contemporaneous, or through a 
valid advance directive or legally appointed surrogate if they are incompetent. Where 
possible, patient values should be elicited about what quality of life they would judge 
acceptable following intensive medical treatment. 
 
Assess urgency, delay non-urgent treatment  
If clinical need is nonurgent, a trial of lower levels of care (e.g. continuous positive airway 
pressure (CPAP), noninvasive ventilation) should be instituted to reduce demand on critical 
care. A treatment escalation plan should be in place in case they subsequently deteriorate.  
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Consider availability of resource  
The resource (CPAP, ventilator, ICU care, extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO), 
organ support) is either sufficient for the needs of all relevant patients or it is not. If it is 
sufficient, then a principle of equal treatment for equal need applies. In intensive care, this 
principle will often take the form of ‘first come, first served’, allocating preferentially to 
those arriving first for medical attention. 
 
If there are insufficient resources, one solution would be to increase availability. Where this 
is not possible (or has already occurred, and resources are still insufficient), ‘first come, first 
served’ would mean that patients with poor prognosis, requiring long periods of treatment 
be treated at the expense of patients arriving later with much better prognosis. This will 
inevitably mean a reduction in the number of lives saved. It would also be unfair because 
when someone happens to fall ill (earlier or later) would decide allocation. According to 
principle of temporal neutrality,
8
 when a harm occurs should not make a moral difference. 
In an accompanying paper,
1
 we discuss a number of other shortcomings of ‘first come, first 
served’ when there are limited resources.
 
 
First level allocation: save the most lives 
The first ethical principle for allocation aims to maximise the numbers of lives saved. This is 
a basic principle endorsed by triage in settings of overwhelming medical need (for example 
disaster, battlefields or pandemics). It is supported by both popular intuition and multiple 
ethical theories, as we now show. 
 
Imagine you are manning the sole coastguard boat on duty. Two boats have overturned 
some distance from each other. There are five people in one life raft due north and some 50 
miles away due south, another single person is on a life raft. A storm is brewing and it is 
likely that you will only be able to get to one life raft before the storm overturns them and 
the sailors drown. Which direction should you go? Some years ago, when we asked a 
random sample of the public, 98% of respondents (88/90) elected to save five drowning 
people rather than one person; only 2% elected to toss a coin to decide.
9
  
 
According to utilitarianism, resources should be distributed to bring about the most good: 
the greatest good to the greatest number. But non-utilitarian theories can also recognise 
the importance of this principle. According to a contractualist approach, the right 
distribution is the one we would choose from behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, that is, if we did 
not know who we would be in society. From behind the veil, rational self-interest requires 
that you choose the policy that gives you the greatest chance of surviving.  
 
We should save more lives rather than fewer, other things being equal. We can call this the 
moral requirement to save the greatest number. It should be a universal requirement of 
rationing. In practice, saving the greatest number logically entails saving those patients with 
a higher probability of surviving. Imagine one group, A, has a 90% chance of surviving with 
treatment, and another group, B, has a 10%. For every 10 people treated in group A, 9 will 
survive, but only one will survive from B. 
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Saving the greatest number also requires estimating patients’ duration of treatment and 
other resource use, since longer duration of therapy means fewer patients can be treated. 
Imagine patients in group A take 1 week to recover and patients in B take 2 weeks. We can 
save two patients in group A for every one patient in B. Group A patients, like those with 
higher probability, should have priority. 
 
These two factors affecting number saved can be combined in the concept of a Resource 
Adjusted Probability Ratio (RAPR).  
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The concept captures that patients who have higher probabilities of survival and are 
expected to recover quickly (freeing up the resources for others) should have highest 
priority. Length of stay is a good proxy for resource use. For example, if a patient has a 50% 
chance of survival and the predicted length of stay is 10 days, whereas the average length of 
stay is 5 days, the RAPR is 25%. 
 
Different patient factors may predict prognosis, for example, biological age, frailty, and 
comorbidity may reduce the RAPR in patients with COVID-19 respiratory failure. Any factor 
that reduces probability of survival or increases resource use is relevant at this stage. This is 
the ethical justification for recent NICE guidance to consider not providing intensive care to 
patients with high frailty scores.
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 Would this be discriminatory? 
 
It would be discriminatory to include criteria in allocation that are not ethically relevant (for 
example race, sexuality, religion or political beliefs). However, it is not discrimination to use 
patient characteristics to estimate prognosis unless a characteristic is used to systematically 
disadvantage a group. For example, age per se (without consideration of prognosis) would 
be ageist and arguably unlawful discrimination under the Equality Act 2010.
10
 But using 
probability of survival is an ethically defensible criterion. 
 
Based on the RAPR, patients could be classified into three categories. Those whom clinicians 
are confident have a high probability of survival (and low resource use) should receive the 
life sustaining treatment (LST). For example, this might be approximately >80% survival but 
the absolute threshold will be relative to the numbers of patients needing the life sustaining 
treatment resource and the availability of the resource at a time. In cases of extreme 
scarcity, it may be that only those with >90% chance of survival can be treated, while in 
health systems with greater resources relative to demand, the threshold could be lower. 
The figure may vary across a time in one institution as the resource availability may change. 
 
Those in the low probability survival group (and high resource use) would usually be given 
lower levels of care such as ward care or palliative care. Again, the actual figure used to 
indicate low priority will be relative to resource availability. It might be those with <10% 
survival but as low as <5% in conditions of relative abundance. 
 
We recognise that there are significant error margins around any figure. Prognostic 
uncertainty
 
is one of the major problems of a decision-making process for resource 
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allocation,
11
 but still we must reduce it to a minimum and then we should tolerate the 
residual uncertainty.  
 
Second level allocation – selection of which patients to save 
The first level of allocation aims at saving the greatest number. High RAPR patients should 
receive the resource.  But there may be more high RAPR patients than there are ventilators. 
In this case, a different allocation procedure will be needed for this group. Or there may be 
sufficient ventilators for this group but a large second group of moderate RAPR patients 
who may not be able to all receive treatment. Principles will be needed to select from this 
moderate group. 
 
There are several possible policy options. Any or all of these could be employed and will be 
employed in different jurisdictions depending on ethics (including values) and laws of that 
society. All are potentially ethically defensible.  
1. Lottery. A simple lottery or ‘first come, first served’ could be used for this group, or a 
selection of the group. (Since high priority patients have already been selected for 
treatment, and low priority selected against treatment, such a lottery would have 
less impact on overall survival.) 
2. Second triage. This could involve either, or both, or sequential assessment of 
predicted length and quality of life. Utilitarians consider both the expected increase 
in length and quality of life to be relevant. For example, one could set a minimum of 
5 years expected of life after treatment as a threshold. This could be used to decide 
amongst moderate prognosis candidates. Quality of life could also be considered. 
For example, those with severe impairments of cognition or consciousness (such as 
late dementia) would not be candidates on this criterion. This may or may not be 
lawful depending on the legal jurisdiction.
10
 This option will maximize the Quality 
Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), a standard metric of evaluating the effectiveness of 
health interventions and used in other areas for resource allocation and decisions 
about distributive justice. 
3. Priority. Priority could be accorded on utilitarian or desert-based grounds to health 
care workers who have contracted COVID-19 in the course of their work. Priority 
could also be accorded to younger patients just because they have enjoyed less life, 
that is, on grounds of desert. For example, the Pittsburgh guidelines recommend the 
following categories: age 12-40, age 41-60; age 61-75; older than age 75.
4
 
4. Trial of Treatment. Some consideration of equality of opportunity could be afforded 
to those with uncertain or moderate chances of survival by offering a fixed term trial 
of treatment followed by withdrawal. This would address consideration of excessive 
resource use and still give poorer prognosis patients a chance.  
 
Some of these features (e.g. age) have already contributed to an assessment of probability 
of survival in the first stage of allocation. In this second phase, they operate more directly. 
For example, age might be used to prioritise some patients on the basis of desert. That is, 
even if probability of survival were the same, this would give weight to younger people 
based on desert considerations. Desert is related to fairness. If you commit a crime, you 
deserve punishment. If you have had less cake (life), you deserve more. Similarly, a severe 
cognitive impairment might reduce probability of survival (and be included in the universal 
assessment) or it might be used as an optional criterion of allocation. Severe cognitive 
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impairment would also affect the ability to appreciate the benefits of a successful 
treatment.  
 
Quality of life is a hugely contested concept. Broadly, it can be construed subjectively or 
objectively. Both concepts are ethically defensible and different societies will accept 
different standards. A subjective assessment is determined by the patient themselves. An 
objective assessment might include: absence of suffering, happiness, minimal cognitive 
capacity, full consciousness, capacity to engage in meaningful human relationships.
12
  
It will be up to particular societies to decide whether quality of life should be included or 
what standard should be employed. 
 
Utilitarianism favours Second Triage and Priority (on grounds of utility, not desert). 
Egalitarians favour Lottery. Trial of Treatment gives some consideration to both equality and 
utility.
13
 
 
Decision-Making 
Decision-making should be the clinician’s ultimate responsibility, in consultation with 
patients, their families and colleagues. They will be best placed to know the facts around 
patient numbers, need, urgency, resource availability, prognosis, likely survival and future 
level of function.  
 
However, decision making should be informed by the ethical principles and values proposed 
in this algorithm. At a minimum, every reviewed proposal for allocation of ventilators in the 
pandemic should include prioritisation of chance of survival. Differences between countries 
in their chosen approach to allocation (Table 1) is inevitable, and will reflect the ethical 
choices of particular societies. However, these values must be made explicit and decisions 
not left to personal values, conscience, intuition, religion or idiosyncrasy. Algorithmic ethics 
makes these values and their relationship explicit. How these values are applied will depend 
on the facts. But we should as a society agree on the ethical values and their relationship. As 
events such as the COVID-19 pandemic befall us, our values and choices play a significant 
role in determining who lives and who dies.  
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 First level Triage Second level principles (tie break or supplementary) 
Pandemic allocation guidelines Probability of survival Duration 
of 
therapy 
required 
Life-
years/Quality 
Reciprocity (priority 
to health workers or 
young) 
Equal share - Fixed 
duration (time-limited 
trial) 
Equal chance (lottery or 
first-come-first-served) 
SIAARTI (Italy),
2
 Clinical ethics 
recommendations for the 
allocation of intensive care 
treatments in exceptional, 
resource-limited circumstances 
 Comorbidities, functional 
status, Age (no specific cut 
off) 
X  X  
ICU trial (daily re-evaluation) 
X 
NICE (UK)
3 
COVID-19 rapid guideline: 
critical care in adults 
 
Frailty (not applied to 
younger people, stable long-
term disabilities, learning 
disabilities and autism), 
Comorbidities, Severity of 
acute illness 
X X X Review of treatment suggested X 
University of Pittsburgh (US)
4 
Allocation of scarce critical care 
resources during a public health 
emergency 
 
SOFA scores, comorbidities 
X X  
Both 
Periodic reassessment X 
Daugherty and colleagues (US)
5 
Too Many Patients…A 
Framework To Guide Statewide 
Allocation Of Scarce Mechanical 
Ventilation During Disasters  
 
Likelihood of short-term 
survival (SOFA scores), 
likelihood of long-term 
survival (severe 
comorbidities) 
 
X X  
Life-cycle preference for 
young  
Pregnant women  
X  
After other principles 
Emanuel and colleagues (XX)
6 
Fair Allocation of Scarce 
Medical Resources in the Time 
of Covid-19 
 
 
X  
Life-years only in 
comparing patients 
whose likelihood of 
survival is similar 
No evaluation of QoL 
or QALY 
 
Priority to health care 
workers when other 
factors similar; 
Youngest first when it 
aligns with maximizing 
benefits 
 
 
 
No first-come first-served; 
Random selection among patients 
with similar prognosis 
 
New York State Task Force on 
Life and the Law, New York 
State Department of Health
7 
Ventilator allocation guidelines 
 
Likelihood of short-term 
survival (SOFA scores) 
X X  
Young age may be 
considered as a tie-
breaking criterion in 
limited circumstances 
 
Review at 48 and 120 h 
 Lottery after other principles 
Table 1: Comparison of ventilator/intensive care allocation guidelines proposed or being applied in the setting of the COVID-19 pandemic 
 
